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‘… without the fact of oppression, there can be no practice of
resistance and no notion of rights.’
Mamdani, cited in Nyamu-Musembi 2002 
Introduction
Most contributions to this volume work from a perspective that is able
to incorporate the insight from Mamdani above. In contrast, the
dominant discourses on human rights effectively block such considerat-
ions by failing to give proper analytical weight to the link between
social movement struggles and the historical emergence of human
rights. In my view, the very dominance of such accounts has led to
important conceptual difficulties and incapacity to assess properly the
potentials and limits of human rights. 
What I want to do in this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate the
necessity for a proper re-evaluation of the historical praxis through
which human rights emerged in the North. The argument that
follows is illustrative and provisional since it will range over a 350-
year time span and select issues and examples from both European and
American history. My task here is not to provide a new substantive
historical account of the Northern history of human rights, rather
simply to show that such an alternative historical account is possible.
That said, illustrative and provisional though it is, the evidence
presented here (drawn largely from authoritative historical scholar-
ship) is already sufficient to raise serious questions regarding the
accuracy of the standard accounts from both proponents and critics of
human rights. 
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Social movement struggles against power: a history
obscured
The mainstream literature on human rights does not explicitly deny a
connection between human rights and social movement struggles.
Indeed, on occasion, the existence of such a link has been acknow-
ledged (for example, Weston 1992). Yet the dominant discourses from
both proponents and critics are not analytically equipped to grasp the
way in which human rights have been socially constructed in the
context of social movement challenges to extant relations and structures
of power. This analytical closure arises from a range of embedded
assumptions in the academic disciplines and theoretical perspectives
from which the vast bulk of the literature on human rights arises. 
In a previous paper (Stammers 1999) I identified four such perspec-
tives, labelled ‘metaphysical abstraction’, ‘legal positivism’, ‘strong
particularism’ and ‘structuralism’. The first two of these are deeply
embedded in the discourses from proponents of human rights, while the
latter two are crucial elements of discourses from critics of human
rights. 
The problem with metaphysical abstraction lies quite simply in
attempts to construct supposedly timeless and universal understandings
of human rights that are entirely independent of social context and thus
social movement struggles. Associated in disciplinary terms with
philosophy and political theory, variations of metaphysical abstraction
lie at the heart of virtually all liberal and social democratic attempts to
justify and ground the concept of human rights theoretically.
The term ‘legal positivism’ is not to be understood here in its
technical sense. Rather, it signals the intent and ambition of what might
be termed the global ‘human rights industry’. There is an enormous
literature arising from this industry: a literature overwhelmingly
concerned with the establishment, implementation and enforcement of
human rights as state and international public law. In this perspective, it
is not that social movement struggles are unrecognized – they would
probably be acknowledged as having provoked important recent
debates on human rights. Yet they are not considered to have any
analytic value because these approaches focus on the institutionalization
and legal codification of human rights. Thus, this perspective precludes
any serious consideration of the non-legal or pre-legal dimensions of
human rights. While obviously associated with the discipline of law,
such approaches also represent the ‘realist’1 orientation of these state and
non-state actors: those international agencies and organizations who are
in the business of ‘doing’ human rights in an institutionalized context.
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Approaches grouped under the heading of ‘strong particularism’
emphasize the particularities of the social construction of human rights.
But they do so in an overly homogenized way. This perspective fails to
grasp the full extent to which relations and structures of power are
multifaceted and necessarily operate both within and between what are
assumed to be (or assumed should be) sealed and homogenized cultural
formations and political communities. Associated most obviously with
the discipline of anthropology, strong particularist perspectives are also
derived from elements of post-structuralist and post-modernist thought,
and have been utilized by a range of politicians and activists in the South
to resist the encroachment or imposition of ‘Western’ values.2
Structuralist approaches see human rights as a ‘product’ or an ‘effect’
of what are believed to be more fundamental structural dynamics within
social relations. While rightly grasping the importance of structure in
shaping social relations, such approaches then typically rely on overly
simplistic monocausal models to explain social change, while at the
same time denying the capacity for human action to constitute
meaningful agency. Unsurprisingly, advocates of this perspective see
little or no positive potential in social movement struggles for human
rights. Structuralist explanations can be found in a range of academic
disciplines, but here they are probably more usefully understood as
specific strands within broader schools of social and political thought
such as Marxism and post-structuralism. 
Despite their very significant differences, all these perspectives share
an important characteristic. Each for their own reason fails to take
proper account of historical praxis and processes. In each case, a priori
assumptions take the place of concrete historical analysis. Such assump-
tions result in arguments from proponents and critics tending to mirror
and contest each other, rather than making any effective connection to
history and social reality. We can see this at work in three areas of debate
crucial to contemporary debates on human rights. These are the
relationships between:
• civil and political rights on one hand, and economic and social rights
on the other; 
• individual rights and collective rights;
• universal and particular dimensions of human rights.
While there are signs of an increasing stress on complexity and inter-
dependence (for example, Mahoney and Mahoney 1993; Pollis and
Schwab 2000), much of the specialist literature on human rights over
the last 50 years or so has focused on claimed fundamental differences
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